We extend the -calculus and the spi-calculus with two primitives that guarantee authentication. They enable us to abstract from various implementations/specifications of authentication, and to obtain idealized protocols which are "secure by construction". The main underlying idea, originally proposed in [14] for entity authentication, is to use the locations of processes in order to check who is sending a message (authentication of a party) and who originated a message (message authentication). The theory of local names, developed in [6] for the -calculus, gives us almost for free both the partner authentication and the message authentication primitives.
Introduction
Authentication is one of the main issues in security and it can have different purposes depending on the specific application considered. For example, entity authentication is related to the verification of an entity's claimed identity [18] , while message authentication should make it possible for the receiver of a message to ascertain its origin [30] . In recent years there have been some formalizations of these different aspects of authentication (see, e.g., [3, 7, 13, 16, 17, 22, 29] ). These formalizations are crucial for proofs of authentication properties, that sometimes have been automatized (see, e.g. [12, 15, 20, 21, 25] ). A typical approach presented in the literature is the following. First, a protocol is specified in a certain formal model. Then
The -calculus
In this section we briefly recall the monadic -calculus [24] , a model of concurrent communicating processes based on the notion of naming. Our presentation slightly differs from the usual ones and it will make it easier to introduce later on the spi-calculus The main difference from standard presentation relies in the introduction of the new syntactic category of terms, where names and variables are distinguished. Hereafter, the trailing 0 will be omitted. We Intuitively, ¼ represents the null process which can do nothing. The prefix is the first atomic action that the process È can perform. After the execution of the process È behaves like È . The input prefix Å´Üµ binds the name Ü in the prefixed process as follows: when a name AE is received along the link named Å, all the (free) occurrences of Ü in the prefixed process È are substituted with Å. The output prefix Å AE does not bind the name AE which is sent along Å. Summation denotes nondeterministic choice. The process È ½ · È ¾ behaves like either È ½ or È ¾ . The operator describes parallel composition of processes.
The components of È ½ È ¾ may act independently; also, an output action of È ½ (resp. È ¾ ) at any output port Å may synchronize with an input action of È ¾ (resp. È ½ ) at Å. The value sent by È ½ replaces the relevant occurrences of the placeholder Ü in È ¾ . The operator´ Ñ µacts as a static declaration (i.e. a binder for) the name Ñ in the process È that it prefixes. In other words, Ñ is a unique name in È which is different from all the external names. The agent´ Ñ µ Èbehaves as È except that actions at ports Ñ and Ñ are prohibited.
However communications along link Ñ of components within È are allowed. Matching Å AE È is an if-then operator: process È is activated only if Å AE. Finally, the process È behaves as infinitely many copies of È running in parallel.
We write fn´Å µ and fn´È µ for the sets of names free in term Å and process È , respectively, and fv´Å µ and fv´È µ for the sets of variables free in term Å and process È , respectively. A closed term or process is a term or process without free variables.
Semantics.
The semantics for the -calculus we consider here is a late semantics, based on a reduction relation and on a commitment relation. Some structural congruence rules are also needed. The commitment relation depends on the abstraction and concretion constructs:
An abstraction has the form´ÜµÈ , where´Üµ binds Ü in È .
A concretion has the form´ Ñµ Å È , where Å is a term, È is a process and the names in Ñ are bound by´ Ñµ in Å and È .
An agent or is an abstraction, a concretion or a process.
If is the abstraction´ÜµÈ and the concretion´ Ñµ Å É and Ñ fn´È µ , then the interactions and are:
´ Ñ µ´È Å Ü É µ ´ Ñ µ´É È Å Ü µ
Congruence. The structural congruence on processes is defined in the standard way, except for the treatment of parallel composition that is assumed to be neither commutative nor associative. It is then defined to be the least congruence satisfying: 
In the following, we will never distinguish congruent terms.
Reduction relation.
The reduction relation is the least relation on closed processes that is transitive and closed under all contexts, and that satisfies the following axioms:
Commitment relation.
An action is a name Ñ (representing input) or a co-name Ñ (representing output) or a distinguished silent action . Note that actions record only the channel on which the input or the output occurs. The commitment relation is written È « , where È is a closed process, « is an action, and is a closed agent. It is defined by the rules in Tab. 1.
Relative Addresses and their Composition
We recall here the ideas of [6] that serve as a basis for the authentication mechanisms we are going to introduce. Consider for a while the binary parallel composition as the main operator of the -calculus (neither associative nor commutative). Then, build abstract syntax trees of processes as binary trees, called trees of (sequential) processes, as follows. Given a process È , the nodes of its tree correspond to the occurrences of the parallel operator in È , and its leaves are the sequential components of È (roughly, those processes whose top-level operator is a prefix or a summation or a replication). A tree of processes is depicted in Fig. 1 . 
The tree of (sequential) processes of´È ¼ È ½ µ ´È ¾ ´È ¿ È µµ
Assume now that the left (resp. right) branches of a tree of sequential processes denote the left (resp. right) component of parallel compositions, and label their arcs with tag ¼ (resp. ½ ). Therefore, any sequential component in a process is uniquely identified by a string over ¼ ½ £ . The string corresponds to a path from the root, the top-level of the whole process, to a leaf. Intuitively, is the address of the sequential component relative to the root of the binary tree.
Consider now two different sequential processes, say and Ê, in a tree and call the path between them the address of the process relative to the process Ê. This relative address can be decomposed into two parts according to the minimal common predecessor È of and Ê in the tree. The relative address is then a string written ¯ ¼ , made of ¼ 's and ½ 's, where represents the path from È to Ê, 2 and ¼ the path from È to . Let and Ê respectively be the processes È ¿ and È ½ of Fig. 1 . The address of È ¿ relative to È ½ is then ¼ ½¯ ½ ½ ¼ (read the path upwards from È ½ to the root and reverse, then downwards to È ¿ ). So to speak, the relative address points back from Ê to .
Relative addresses can be composed, in order to obtain new relative addresses. For instance, the composition of the relative address ½ ¼¯ ¼ ½ of È ½ w.r.t. È ¾ (in Fig. 1 ) with the relative address of È ¿ w.r.t.
Below we recall the formal definition of relative addresses and we define their composition. More intuition, the full definitions and the statements of some of their properties are in [6] . the two components of the relative address describe the two distinct paths going out from the same node in a binary tree. Also, Ð ¼ Ð ½ when both refer to the same path, exchanging its source and target.
Address composition is a partial operation, defined only when relative addresses can indeed be composed. We make sure that this is always the case when we apply it. Fig. 2 
Proved semantics
Relative addresses can be inductively built while deducing transitions, when a proved semantics is used [9] . In this section, we recall from [10] the proved transition system for the -calculus, in which labels of transitions encode (a portion of) their deduction tree. The arrows of the proved transition system are labelled by « , where « is an action and is a string of ¼ ½ , used to single out the sub-process that actually performed «. The rules for proved commitment are in Tab. 2. They are essentially those of the standard transition system except for those involving the parallel operator. Rule Comm Par 1 (respectively, Comm Par 2) adds in the label of its conclusion the tag ¼ (respectively, ½ ) to register that the left (respectively, right) component of a parallel composition is moving. The rules defining the congruence and the reduction relation are indeed the same as before. To recover the standard semantics of the -calculus, we only need to erase any occurrence of from the labels of transitions. Note that the information added to labels can be used to inductively build relative addresses. Indeed, the tags are sufficient to recover the parallel structure of a process È because they provide an encoding of the tree of processes of È . For instance, suppose that process « È performs the transition « ¼ . Then, we know that the «-action was performed by a sequential process on the form « È in parallel with some process É. Indeed, the whole system had the form « È É. More generally, if a process Ê performs a transition « , the path in the tree of processes permits to reach the sub-process that performs the « action. Technically, we indicate the sub-process Ê as È , which is inductively selected through the following operator. 
Partner authentication
We now introduce our first authentication mechanism. At run-time, it will guarantee each principal to engage an entire run session with the same partners playing the same roles. We heavily exploit the proved semantics reported in the previous section. We essentially bind sensitive input and output communications to relative addresses. More precisely, channels may have a relative address as index, and assume the form Ð . Now, our Usually, the empty location Ø ¯¯¯is omitted.
The rules defining the congruence and the reduction relation are the same as before, apart from the obvious substitution of located names for names. The rules for the new commitment relation are in Tab. 3, where we omit the symmetric rules for communication. The rules for parallel composition are in the proved style, Variables are not located. Consequently, when a located channel Ð is communicated, it becomes a "free" channel: the location Ð is lost. The index to becomes¯¯¯if so it was; otherwise we get (with not occurring in the process). Formally, we have the following. Using the above definition for communication makes it easier to use a channel in a multiplexing way. Suppose that a process È is committed to communicate on a channel Ð with a process É. Also, assume that È sends Ð to a third party Ê, that receives it as . The "same" channel can now be used for further communications between È and É (in this case located at Ð), as well as for communications between Ê and some other process (after has been suitably instantiated).
In the rules for commitment we use the particular kind of substitution Ð 
There is no case for È in the above definition, i.e. the routed substitution may be applied only to È , after that È has been reduced to È È . This amounts to saying that we are also considering processes that inside have routed substitutions not fully performed. Consequently, the target of the transitions in Tab. 3 may contain expressions on the form È Ð . In order not to burden too heavily our notation, we shall still use È and for processes, abstractions and concretions with substitutions not yet performed.
We use the above definition to implement a selective substitution that works on the sub-process of a whole term reachable through .
The very fact that channels have indexes, which may also be instantiated, guarantees that two partners can establish a connection that will remain stable along a whole session. Indeed, let È ½ ´É Êµ È , where Intuitively, the instantiation of a with an Ð represents a secure declaration of the identity of a process through its location Ð, that cannot be manipulated even by malicious parties. As we will see later on, located actions also give some security guarantees on the subsequent message exchanges.
Example (cont'd)
Consider now the following protocol (recall that ¯¯¯i s simply written as ; we shall comment below on the use of channel , which occurs located in
Here, Bob sends a message to Alice after the reception of Å . Note that Alice is requiring that the second message comes from the same process to which she sent Å . Since, after the first message exchange, the variable is instantiated to the address of ¼ relative to ¼ , our semantics guarantees authentication of the second communication with respect to the (secure) identity declaration of : Alice is assured that the second message will be sent from the same process that received the first one. In order to illustrate this important point we add another process ¼ Å · ´Üµ which tries to communicate over channel . The process È ¼ ¼ has the following steps:
Since the address of ¼ relative to ¼ is ¼ ¼¯ ½ ¼¯ ½ , then either (the residual of) ¼ receives from and only from (the residual of) ¼ or ¼ and ¼ communicate. In the first case we have:
In the second case we have:
In the example above, the same channel is used in two different ways: it is "located" for Alice and Bob; alternatively, it is "free" for ¼ and ¼ . In Example 5.9, we shall see that the same channel can be even used in a multiplexing fashion: two pairs of processes can interleave their communications, still presenting the property of being engaged with the same process along the entire session.
In the next example we consider the situation where the channel is located and used to output a message Å. This usage of channels also guarantees a sort of secrecy of Å. We have seen that locating inputs and outputs corresponds to guaranteeing authentication and secrecy of the communication, respectively. We can summarize these two concepts as follows. In a message exchange and with respect to an address Ð, a process obtains
Partner authentication whenever it receives the message from the process reachable at Ð, only.
Secrecy whenever only the process reachable at Ð will receive the message.
We now state the above more precisely, exploiting Def. 4.1. We need the notion of context with two holes, written . The next example illustrates how locating both inputs and outputs guarantees a permanent hooking between two parties and allows to model multiple sessions quite easily.
Theorem 5.7 (authentication)
Example 5.9 Consider the following processes: 
Note that after the first message exchange the partners in each session are permanently hooked: the second message is always sent to the correct party, the one who initiated the session. As a consequence, no replay of messages is possible among different sessions, also in the presence of a malicious party.
The Spi-Calculus
Syntax. In this section we briefly recall, often also literally, the spi-calculus [3] , in its monadic version from [1] . This calculus is an extension of the -calculus, introduced for the description and the analysis of cryptographic protocols. A first difference with the -calculus is that the spi-calculus has no summation operator ·. Also, terms can be structured as pairs´Å AE), successors of terms ×Ù ´Åµ and encryptions Å ½ Å AE . The last term above represents the ciphertext obtained by encrypting Å ½ Å under the key AE, using a shared-key cryptosystem such as DES [27] . 
where may either be Å´Üµ or Å AE . 3 Most of the process constructs are the same of -calculus. The new ones decompose terms: The process × Ä Ó Ü ½ Ü AE Ò È attempts to decrypt Ä with the key AE; if Ä has the form Å ½ Å AE , then the process behaves as È Å ½ Ü ½ Å Ü , and otherwise is stuck.
The structural congruence and the operational semantics for commitment are exactly the same of thecalculus given in Table 1 . Some new reductions rules are instead needed.
Names of the spi-calculus handled locally
To introduce our second authentication mechanism, we need to further exploit the ideas contained in [6] , where the relative addresses, introduced in Section 3, are used to handle names locally to sequential processes in an operational manner. The space of names of a whole process is then partitioned into local environments associated each with its sequential sub-processes.
To avoid global management of names, we have to solve two problems. Names have to be declared locally and to be brand-new in that local environment. Furthermore, when a name is exported to other local environments via communications or by applying a reduction rule, we must guarantee that there are no clashes involving the other names around. A purely mechanical way of doing that is in [6] .
For the sake of simplicity, instead of recalling also the mechanism for generating fresh names, here we assume that a name is fresh, whenever needed, and we shall recall that by a side condition.
As for keeping names distinct, consider two different sequential processes, say and Ê, that have two syntactically equal names, say Ò. Suppose now that sends Ò to Ê. To distinguish between the two different instances of Ò in the local environment of Ê, the name generated by will be received enriched with the address of relative to Ê, which points back from Ê to the local environment of .
A slightly more complex situation arises when a process receives a name and sends it to another process. The name must arrive at the new receiver with the address of the generator (not of the sender) relative to the new receiver. Consider again Fig. 1 , where È ½ sends to È ¾ a name generated by È ¿ . The rules (in Tab. 4) for communication use address composition to determine the address of È ¿ relative to È ¾ , by composing the address of the message (recording the address of È ¿ w.r.t. È ½ ) with the relative address of È ½ w.r.t. È ¾ .
We carry the localized semantics of the -calculus of [6] on the monadic spi-calculus. First of all, we introduce the new set of localized names, that are names prefixed with relative addresses.
Definition 7.1 Let AE ¼ ´ ¡ AE µ be the set of localized names, where AE is the set of standard names and "¡" is the operator of language concatenation.
For simplicity, we assume Ö × Ù possibly indexed, to range over both AE ¼ and AE and, unless necessary, we do not syntactically distinguish localized terms from terms, i.e. terms prefixed with relative addresses like ¯ ¼ Å, from those not prefixed.
As we said above, we do not recall how the mechanism of [6] generates fresh names whenever needed: here we simply assume them fresh. However, we require that restricted names are always localized, i.e. they occur in a declaration as´ ¯Òµ. Technically, this is achieved by transforming a process È with´ Ò µ into a new process, obtained by replacing each sub-process of P on the form´ Ò µ Éwith the procesś ¯ÒµÉ ¯Ò Ò × (the substitution × is in Def. 7.3).
When a term Å is exported from a process, say È , to another, say É, it is necessary to compose the relative address prefixing Å with the relative address of È w.r.t. É. This composition is performed by the term address composition, that extends address composition in Def. 3.2. Applied to a relative address and to a localized term, it returns an updated localized term.
Definition 7.2 Term address composition Ì is defined as
We say that ¯ ¼ Ì ¼¯ ½ Å, is the term ¼¯ ½ Å exported to the relative address ¯ ¼ . Names in AE, variables and natural numbers are not prefixed with relative addresses and are insensitive to address composition:
Þ ¾ AE AE Ø Î ¯ ¼ Þ Þ
We now explain how our semantics deals with terms. First, note that the operator Ì considers the compound term Å as a whole, as it does not distribute address composition over the sub-terms of Å. Now, consider the encryption term Å Ã . It is an atomic entity, and so it is handled as it were a new name, local to the process that encrypts Å, say È . The two localized terms Å and Ã are frozen just like they were at encryption time, and their own relative addresses are not changed when the encrypted message is sent through the net; again, these relative addresses cannot be updated. Since Å Ã is atomic, its relative address, say ¼¯ ½ , will always point to the process È that made the encryption. (Technically, Å and Ã are frozen like they were in the process Ë containing all the restrictions on the names used in the encryption.) In this way, when decrypting Å Ã the semantic rules recover the correct addresses for Å and Ã by simply composing the actual address of Å Ã , ¼¯ ½ , with the (frozen) relative addresses of Å and Ã, respectively. The same management described above is used for successor and pairs. In the first case, the term Å is frozen in ×Ù ´Åµ, while the terms Å and AE are frozen in´Å AEµ .
Also the routed substitution of Def. 5.3 is extended to deal both with terms and with processes in the spi-calculus; it distributes to each sub-term or sub-process (note that below the term AE cannot be a variable). 
Now, the selective routed substitution for the spi-calculus is exactly as in Def. 5.4.
Localized Congruence. The rules for the structural congruence require some changes to accommodate localized names.
Note that no «-conversion is needed: each binding occurrence of the name Ö in È ½ (È ¾ , resp.) is replaced by ¼ Ö ( ½ Ö , resp.) which is different from any name × in È ½ (È ¾ , resp.) , because of the properties of address composition .
Localized Reduction Relation. We add the following reduction rules to those for matching and replication.
When a process decomposes a term, the involved sub-terms are updated. The intuition for the decryption rule is that we can decrypt a message Å AE only if we use the key Ã ¼¯ ½ Ì AE which is exactly how the frozen key AE should appear to the receiver of the encrypted message. When Ã and AE, although starting from different sites, do refer to the same key, the semantic rules decrypt the message and update its relative address by composing ¼¯ ½ and Å. 
To see how the localized interactions work, consider . The restricted names, known as Ö in È ½ , are duly updated to¯ ¼ Ö in the parallel composition of È ¼ ¼ (i.e. È ¼ after the substitution) and È ½ . As for the message, it appears as Å in È ½ and has to be exported at È ¼ : the term address composition Ì is therefore applied to the relative address ½¯ ¼ and to Å. As an example, consider again the processes in Fig. 1 and suppose that È ¼ is willing to send¯AE to the process È ¿ . Then, the message will appear as¯ ¼ ¼ AE iń È ¼ È ½ µ. It will replace, through the routed substitution, the variable Ü in´È ¾ ´È ¿ È µ as ½¯ ¼ ¼ AE. Note that it will arrive to È ¿ as ½ ½ ¼¯ ¼ ¼ AE, i.e. enriched with the relative address of È ¼ w.r.t. È ¿ .
Message Authentication
We can now intuitively present our authentication primitive Å AE , akin to the matching operator. This "address matching" is passed only if the relative addresses of the two localized terms Å and AE coincide. 
ÓÑÑ ÇÙØ
Ö Å È Ö ´ µ Å È ÓÑÑ ÁÒ Ö´Üµ È Ö ´ÜµÈ ÓÑÑ È Ö ½ È ¼ « ¼ È ¼ È ½ « ¼ ¼ È ½ ÓÑÑ È Ö ¾ È ½ « ½ È ¼ È ½ « ½ È ¼ ½ ÓÑÑ ÁÒØ Ö ½ È ¼ Ö ¼ ¼ È ½ Ö ¼ ½ È ¼ È ½ ¼ ½ if Ö ¼ ¼ ¯ ½ ¼ Ö ÓÑÑ ÁÒØ Ö ¾ È ¼ Ö ¼ È ½ Ö ¼ ¼ ½ È ¼ È ½ ¼ ½ if Ö ¼ ½ ¼¯ ¼ Ö ÓÑÑ Ê × È « ´ Ù µ È « ´ Ù µ if¯¯ « ¾ Ù Ù ÓÑÑ Ê È È ¼ È ¼ « ¼ È « ¼ ÓÑÑ ËØÖÙ Ø È É É « ¼ È « ¼The intuition is that if we know which process packed AE, say È , we can also say that Å comes indeed from È , thus authenticating it. More formally, the extensions due to the new primitive consist in a new case for processes and a new reduction rule.
ÐÅ Ð ¼ AE È is a process, on which we define the following reduction rule:
Red Address Match ÐÅ ÐAE È È .
Note that free names are prefixed with the empty relative address.
Hereafter, we assume an initial start-up phase, in which processes exchange a message and fix their relative addresses. This can be obtained, e.g., through a preliminary communication between the partners, from to on a restricted shared channel. This start-up phase is indeed an abstraction of the preliminary secure exchange of secret information (e.g., long term keys) which is necessary in every cryptographic protocol. We will see an example of this in the next session. This initialization step can be avoided by using our partner authentication primitive; however, for the sake of presentation, we do not combine here the two primitives.
Consider the following simple example, where the process wants to authenticate a message from even in the presence of an intruder . The protocol È is:
Å is a name that appears as¯Å in , by assumption; analogously for AE in , below.) Now we show the role that localized names play, and how they guarantee by construction that ¼ is executed only if the message bound to Ü has been originated by , i.e., if the message received on channel is indeed Å. As said above, the relative address ½ ¼¯ ¼ pointing from to , encodes the "site" hosting , thus it gives the identity of the process from which is expecting to receive a message on channel . In order to analyze the behaviour of the protocol in a hostile environment, we consider a generic intruder , as powerful as possible.
We now examine the following two possible message exchanges:
The first message represents the correct exchange of message Å from to . The second one is an attempt of to send a different message AE to . The intruder could actually be of the following form:
The names Å and AE are received by prefixed by the relative address corresponding to the respective originators. Fig. 3 shows the two message exchanges. In particular we see that Å is received by as ½ ¼¯ ¼ Å while AE becomes ¼¯ ½ AE. It is now immediate to see that only in the first case will evolve to Å Ü × ,
The process detects that the message ½ ¼¯ ¼ Å is authentic while the message ¼¯ ½ AE comes from the intruder .
while in the latter it will stop. This is so because only ½ ¼¯ ¼ Å matches with the address of . Every attempt of the intruder of introducing new messages on is filtered out by the authentication primitive.
A further interesting case arises when the intruder intercepts Å and forwards it to . We will show that our mechanism accepts the message as authentic. In particular, we reconsider the previous protocol and we analyze the case of a different intruder that, masquerading as (written ´ µ), intercepts Å and forwards it to :
Since does not, actually cannot modify Å we would like to accept the message in even if it has been forwarded by . No matter how many times a message is forwarded, address composition maintains its integrity and the identity of its generator. In detail, ´ µ receives Å as ½ ½¯ ¼ Å. When forwards it to , the message is composed with the address of relative to , ¼¯ ½ , yielding´ ¼¯ ½ ½ ½¯ ¼ µÅ.
By applying the rule (1) 
Implementing Authentication
In this section we show that our notion of message authentication based on locations helps studying and analysing cryptographic protocols. The main idea is to observe if a specific authentication protocol is indeed a good "implementation" of our authentication primitive, i.e., if the cryptographic protocol is as strong in detecting names with an "incorrect" relative address as our authentication primitive is.
Recall that in the spi-calculus a compound term, such as an encryption Å, is considered localized, i.e. its relative address, say ¼¯ ½ , will always point to the process È that made the encryption. In this way, when decrypting Å Ã the semantic rules recover the correct addresses for Å and Ã by simply composing the actual address of Å Ã , ¼¯ ¼ , with the (frozen) relative addresses of Å and Ã, respectively.
We now show an example of a correct run of the Wide Mouthed Frog key exchange protocol. Consider its simplified version analyzed in [3] . The two processes and share keys Ã Ë and Ã Ë with a trusted server Ë. In order to establish a secure channel with , sends a fresh key Ã encrypted with Ã Ë to the server Ë. Then, the server decrypts the key and forwards it to , this time encrypted with Ã Ë . Now has the key Ã and can send a message Å encrypted with Ã to . The protocol should guarantee that when receives Å, such a message has been indeed originated by .
The protocol is composed of the following three messages:
Its specification in our calculus with localized names (having mechanically replaced restricted names with their localized counterparts) is:
Not surprisingly, the specification is in the style of [3] , except for localized restricted names. It is well-known that an attack can take place over two sessions of the protocol above. Basically, it occurs when the intruder replays some messages of the first session in the second one. We follow below the formalization of [3] , where this attack is analyzed. Note that in the single session illustrated above no problem arises instead, even if an intruder intercepts the message sent by , then forwarded to . Indeed the message received is the right one, as we have just seen above, as no one can alter neither the relative addresses, nor the encrypted message Å Ã . Now, we show that the attack above is immediately detected by an observer that can compare localized names, e.g. by using our authentication primitive Å AE . For the sake of readability, we call ¼ and ¼ the two instances of and in the second session where ¼ is trying to send the message Å ¼ to ¼ using the session key Ã ¼ :
The intruder eavesdrops the first session and then replays messages ¾ and ¿ in the second session (messages ¾ ¼ and ¿ ¼ ). The result is that ¼ receives a copy of Å instead of one of Å ¼ .
In order to model two parallel session of the protocol, we consider the following specification:
where the addresses of localized names¯Ã Ë and¯Ã Ë are suitably updated in the processes , and We now want to show how the protocol can be done secure by construction through our authentication primitive. The idea is that the last message should be accepted only if it has been originated by the correct initiator. In order to do this we need at least a message from the initiator whose address can be compared with the last message of the protocol. The trick is to add a startup message that securely hooks one initiator with one responder, by sending a fresh message on a restricted channel. The resulting specification follows (the modifications are in bold font and the restricted names are not localized, for the sake of readability):
In È ¼¼ the two ¼¼ processes receive by the two ¼¼ two different startup messages, with two different addresses. It is thus no longer possible for the intruder to carry out a replay attack. In fact, the cheated ¼¼ will be able to stop before delivering the message to . By comparing the traces of this protocol correct "by construction" with the traces of the previous one it is easy to see that they are not equivalent. A potential attack is thus detected. 
Conclusions and Future Work
We defined two primitives that guarantee partner and message authentication over public channels, based on the same semantic feature derived form the proved transition systems [9] . Partner authentication is based on a semantics of the -calculus where names of channels are indexed with the expected relative addresses of the communicating parties. In particular, any time two processes try to communicate over a common channel, their relative addresses are checked against the index of the channel used. The communication is enabled only if the check is passed, i.e. if the relative addresses are compatible with the indexes. Moreover, the very same channel can be used in a multiplexing fashion: two processes, say È and É, can go on exchanging messages on channel , interleaving their activity with that of another pair of processes, say Ê and Ë, using as well. It will be never the case that a message for È is read by Ê or comes from Ë, unless this is indeed the intended behaviour of both È and Ê or both È and Ë. Message authentication is based on a semantics of the spi-calculus where each message Å is localized, via a relative address Ð, to the process È that packed Å. The authentication primitive compares the relative address Ð with the address Ð ¼ of a process É, relative to the receiver of Å. The check succeeds and authenticates the message Å only if Ð Ð ¼ , expressing that it was indeed the process É that packed Å.
Our two primitives are in a sense orthogonal, as they operate on independent features of the calculi considered. Of course, one may combine them, e.g. by carrying on the spi-calculus the notion of located channel introduced for the -calculus. Both notions of authentication can then be guaranteed "by construction".
Note that our partner authentication primitive does not transform a public channel into a private one. Indeed, partner authentication clearly separates the concepts of authentication and secrecy. More importantly, once two processes communicating on public channels are hooked it is impossible for a third process to interfere in the communication.
Our notion of message authentication does not need private channels, as well. A message Å may be considered authentic even if it has been intercepted or eavesdropped, i.e., our mechanism does not guarantee the secrecy of Å, but only that Å has been generated or packed by the claimed entity. Thus, our primitive corresponds neither to a private channel in the basic -calculus, nor to a cryptographic one in the spicalculus: both appear to be too strong to message authentication alone, as they guarantee also secrecy.
The idea of exploiting locations for the analysis of authentication comes from [14] , where however entities are bound to physical addresses of the net. An approach related is Abadi-Fournet-Gonthier's [2] , in which principals have explicit, fixed names (see also the Join-calculus [19] and SEAL [33] ). Here we relaxed the rigidity of a fixed mapping of sites, by introducing a sort of "identifiers of sites" represented by relative addresses. As a matter of fact, the actual placement of a process on a site can be recovered by composing our localized names (akin to the environment function of sequential languages) with allocation tables (similar to a store). Actually, [14] models a wider notion of authentication, that we plan to investigate next.
As discussed in the paper, our primitive may be not implementable directly. Indeed, one should have a low-level, highly reliable mechanism to manage localized names, which is unrealistic in many cases, but possible for instance in LAN or virtual private networks. A further step could be encrypting relative addresses within the header of messages, in the style of IPsec [31] . Nevertheless, our proposal can help reasoning on authentication and security from an abstract point of view. This is indeed the main aim of our approach and we are presently developing some ideas that we briefly describe in the following. First, it could be possible to verify the correctness of a cryptographic protocol by showing that its messages implement partner authentication when needed. As an example, a typical challenge-response technique requires to send a nonce (random challenge) and to expect it back, encrypted with a secret shared key. Challenge-response can be proved to implement our located input actions, under some suitable conditions. The proofs that implementations satisfy specifications are often hard, just because private channels are used to model authenticated channels. Indeed, private channels often seem too far from cryptographic implementations. So our proposal can help, as we need no private channels.
Moreover, we could verify if a cryptography-based protocol ensures message authentication, by checking a version of it containing also the primitive Å AE : the original formulation and ours should exhibit the same behaviour. This check of specifications against implementations, is much in the style of the congruence-based techniques typical of process calculi (see, e.g., [3] ). Finally, we feel confident that our proposal scales up, because some languages for concurrent and reactive systems, like Facile [32] , PICT [28] , CML [26] , Esterel [4] are built on top of a core process calculus like the one we use here; also, they have an operational semantics that can easily be turned into a proved one, as the successful cases of Facile [11] and Esterel [23] show. Of course a great deal of work is still necessary to make our proposal applicable in real cases.
